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Ethics, algorithms and self-driving cars –  
a CSI of the ‘trolley problem’ 
Andrea Renda 
 
Summary 
 
Many experts argue that focusing too much on how automated cars will solve the famous 
‘trolley problem’ isn’t going to get us very far in the debate on the ethics of artificial intelligence 
(AI). But it’s hard to resist if you are a philosopher, an ethicist, a futurist, or simply a geek – and 
it’s fun. Still, this ethical dilemma can reveal a number of outstanding policy issues that are 
often neglected in the public debate.  
 
This paper performs a ‘crime scene investigation’ to find some of the missing parts in the 
ethics/AI quandary. These include the need to preserve human control over machines; the 
need to take data governance and ownership seriously; algorithmic accountability and 
transparency; various forms of user empowerment and their tension in relation to overall 
system control; the need for modernised tort rules; and more generally, a discussion about 
whether algorithms should reflect, exacerbate or mitigate the biases existing in our society.  
 
The investigation concludes that current legal systems are insufficiently equipped to cope with 
most of these issues, and that a mapping of outstanding ethical and policy dilemmas is a useful 
starting point for a thorough overhaul of public policies in this ever-expanding domain.  
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f the dozens of ethical dilemmas posed by the emergence of artificial intelligence and 
advanced machine learning, the ‘trolley problem’ (already a ‘must’ in ethics and moral 
philosophy) is undoubtedly the most popular.1 Scholarly papers, op-eds, blog posts 
and even dedicated websites discuss how automated cars should behave whenever some form 
of collision is inevitable; and whether they should prioritise the life of their occupants, that of 
pedestrians, or neither.2  The MIT’s ‘Moral Machine’ website guides users through various 
scenarios. 3  Some academics discuss the need for “utilitarian” cars, others would prefer 
“prioritarian cars”.4 Other academics use game theory to conclude that pedestrians would 
impose their presence on risk-averse self-driving cars, especially if they behave with impunity.5 
Scholars imagine cars equipped with an “ethical knob”, which could set key patterns of 
behaviour such as “full altruist”, “fully egoist”, or “impartial”.6 Others opt for simple “value of 
life” models as opposed to neural networks, since the latter are “black boxes”, and as such 
would be largely unacceptable to end users.7  
Market players and regulators have not been silent either. Last year the German car 
manufacturer Mercedes took an explicit stance on this ongoing querelle by announcing that 
indeed, their cars were being designed to prioritise occupants over pedestrians; but the 
German Ministry of Transportation immediately challenged this plan by anticipating the 
content of a new regulatory intervention, which would make the Mercedes priority scale 
                                                     
1 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem for a definition of the trolley problem. Also, see M. J. Costa 
(1986), “The Trolley Problem Revisited”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):437-449. 
2 See i.a. S. Nihols and J. Smids (2016), “The Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars: an Applied Trolley 
Problem?”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, November 2016, Volume 19, Issue 5, pp 1275–1289.  
3 See http://moralmachine.mit.edu/  
4 Bonnefon et al. (2017) recently argued that “regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase 
casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology”. See J.F. Bonnefon, A. Shariff, I. Rahwan (2016), “The 
social dilemma of autonomous vehicles”, Science 352, 1573–1576. 
5 See A. Millard-Ball (2016), "Pedestrians, Autonomous Vehicles, and Cities," Journal of Planning Education and 
Research,https://people.ucsc.edu/~adammb/publications/Millard-Ball_2017_Autonomous_vehicles_pedestrians_cities_ 
preprint.pdf. 
6 See G. Contissa, F. Lagioia and G. Sartor (2017), “The Ethical Knob: ethically-customisable automated vehicles 
and the law”, Artificial Intelligence and Law, September 2017, Volume 25, Issue 3, pp 365–378. 
7 See L. R. Sütfeld, R. Gast, P. König and G. Pipa (2017), “Using Virtual Reality to Assess Ethical Decisions in Road 
Traffic Scenarios: Applicability of Value-of-Life-Based Models and Influences of Time Pressure”, Frontiers of 
Behavioural Neuroscience 2017 11:122.  
O 
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illegal.8 A recent guidance paper by the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) went in the same direction, by observing that in some, relatively rare situations, “the 
safety of one person may be protected only at the cost of the safety of another person”, and 
that “algorithms for resolving these conflict situations should be developed transparently using 
input from Federal and State regulators, drivers, passengers and vulnerable road users, and 
taking into account the consequences of [automated vehicles] on others”.9 Meanwhile, the 
three Waymo-enabled FCA cars introduced on the streets of Phoenix, Arizona in October 2017 
are apparently not endowed with any specific moral value and are expected to simply go for 
the “smaller object”:10 but even having no specific rule, as the NHTSA itself acknowledges, is a 
rule.  
So far, so good. But how useful is the trolley problem in prompting a useful policy conversation? 
Or are we just being mesmerised by another chapter of this well-known ethical saga, 
repackaged in a high-tech salsa? Probably the latter is true: experts typically argue that so many 
things must have gone wrong for such a problem to eventually occur in reality, that the 
dilemma is practically irrelevant for policy purposes. And some have also observed that there 
are structural differences between the “human” and the “robotic” version of the trolley 
problem.11 One expert recently put it quite explicitly in a tweet: “Why do people think the 
trolley problem is critical for self-driving cars? The trolley problem wasn’t critical even for 
trolleys”.12 Amitai and Oren Etzioni recently took a similar stance by warning about relying too 
much on extreme scenarios such as the trolley problem to conceptualise the incorporation of 
ethics into AI.13  
Hence, as Zen monks would put it, the answer to the question asked in the trolley problem is 
‘mu’, which simply means: don’t ask (or ‘un-ask’) the question. But a deeper and more critical 
reflection suggests that the problem can unveil a number of unresolved issues that remain 
below the surface in the public and scholarly debate on the future of AI. As such, the trolley 
problem is not a useless dilemma, but focusing on it too much might overlook more important 
overarching issues, just as looking at the finger is meaningless when someone points to the 
moon. The moon, not the finger, is the subject matter of this short reflection.  
                                                     
8 The principle mentioned is “A car never distinguishes between humans based on categories such as age or race”. 
See https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23130923-200-germany-to-create-worlds-first-highway-code-for-
driverless-cars/.  
9  See NHTSA, Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, Accelerating the Next Revolution In Roadway Safety, at 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf.  
10 See http://uk.businessinsider.com/self-driving-cars-already-deciding-who-to-kill-2016-12?r=US&IR=T  
11 See https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-016-9745-2#Fn1  
12 See https://twitter.com/andrewyng/status/791648421291528197  
13 See A. Etzioni and O. Etzioni (2017), “Incorporating Ethics into Artificial Intelligence”, J. Ethics, December 2017, 
Volume 21, Issue 4, pp 403–418. 
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A crime scene investigation 
So, imagine that you are detectives just arrived on site to open a crime scene investigation, and 
need to ask yourselves a few questions about the circumstances that led to the incident. For 
example, what made collision possible? What did the car know about the humans involved? 
What do we know about how the car reached a decision? Who was in charge of deciding over 
the best course of action? Was the self-driving car supposed to behave like a reasonable human 
being? And ultimately, who is liable for the damage incurred? Below, we address these 
questions one by one. And as anticipated, we do not try to solve the trolley problem. 
Problem 1: How did the car end up there? 
In its version featuring automated cars, the trolley problem assumes that there will be 
interactions between cars and pedestrians. We simply imagine cars as they are today, on 
streets that look as they do today, but without a human being behind the steering wheel. We 
assume that pedestrians will walk on pavements at the side of the street as they do today. We 
implicitly assume that they will adopt the same standard of care and the same patterns of 
behaviour when crossing the street.  Are we sure this is going to be the case?  
The answer is uncertain, for many reasons. First, automated cars and trucks may initially be 
deployed in highways, possibly on dedicated lanes, in order to avoid difficult interactions with 
human-driven vehicles.14 In densely populated areas, they would have to interact with both 
human-driven vehicles and unpredictable pedestrians, which would make their job a lot more 
complicated: as a matter of fact, even bad weather conditions can jeopardise the correct 
scanning of the surrounding environment by an autonomous vehicle. This is the reason why 
Waymo is trialling its three FCA cars in the suburbs of Phoenix (AZ), where the street map is 
very simple, the speed is low and the weather is almost always good. In other conditions, 
problems would become much harder to solve for the vehicle: even if it is true that the recent 
performance of algorithms in competitions such as the ‘Stanford dog’ project and Imagenet 
suggest that one day those problems will become more tractable for machines,15  moving 
images are still an enigma for computers: the most successful algorithms still have remarkably 
low success rates when identifying cyclists and their direction, even when the weather is 
good.16  
Moreover, even if automated cars are allowed in densely populated, metropolitan areas, this 
does not automatically imply that pedestrians will use the road in the same way: dedicated 
                                                     
14 See i.a. D. Sabin (2017), “New Algorithm Lets Self-Driving Cars Merge With Traffic Like a School of Fish”, at 
https://www.inverse.com/article/27119-algorithm-merge-autonomous-highway. And Meeder et al. (2017),  
“Autonomous vehicles: Pedestrian heaven or pedestrian hell?”, ETH Zurich, at 
http://www.strc.ch/2017/Meeder_EtAl.pdf  
15 See A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, G. E. Hinton (2012). “Imagenet classification with deep convolutional neural 
networks”. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, https://papers.nips.cc/paper/4824-imagenet-
classification-with-deep-convolutional-neural-networks.pdf.  
16  See https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jun/14/street-wars-2035-cyclists-driverless-cars-autonomous-
vehicles.  
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lanes, pedestrian bridges or underway passes may be built to avoid interference between 
autonomous cars and humans (outside of them).17 At a minimum, new technologies based on 
stigmergy such as Starling Crossing could be deployed to allow pedestrians to cross the road 
only when it is safe to do so.18 Duke University’s Human and Autonomy Lab is also studying 
various ways in which self-driving cars will communicate to pedestrians in case of interaction, 
something that should make the trolley problem even less likely.19  
Our first lesson is thus that we can still decide whether we want the trolley problem to occur 
in practice. There is no need to design rules in a way that puts algorithms and AI in charge of 
deciding over human lives. And no need to imagine the future as a slight variant on what exists 
today. On the contrary, we can make design decisions in ways that preserve the outstanding 
potential of automated transportation, at the same time avoiding the delegation of tragic 
choices to machines. This will also be useful for self-driving car manufacturers: as a matter of 
fact, no matter how many lives will be saved by automated cars, the ones that are ended will 
count more in the eyes of the citizens. The level of acceptability of a killer machine veering onto 
a wall to kill the occupant of a car or changing direction to crush a small group of bystanders is 
much lower than that of a drunk-driver running over an innocent pedestrian. And acceptability 
is essential for new technologies to succeed.   
Our first lesson also leads to a first rule: whenever possible, policy decisions should give priority 
to alternatives that do not place robots or self-learning algorithms in a position to decide over 
human lives. This rule potentially applies even if other alternatives appear more efficient from 
a cost-benefit perspective. This rule partly overlaps with the need for “human control” specified 
by rule 16 of the Asilomar principles:20 but it goes beyond that, embracing a specific approach 
to the precautionary principle.  
Problem 2: What did the car know? 
In our crime scene investigation, do we know what information was available to the car? The 
answer to this question is crucial, and not only for liability purposes: some individuals might be 
willing to delegate the decision to a very well-informed car, but not to a car that only relies on 
its own, highly imperfect sensors. In other words, in order to appraise the risk associated with 
our decision it is essential to factor into the analysis the degree of confidence we have in the 
adequacy of the inputs received by the machine; in the soundness of the process it follows to 
elaborate the input; and in the quality and accuracy of the output (the decision itself). As 
                                                     
17 Incidentally, the fact that we picture automated cars in metropolitan areas is a significant victory for the 
automotive industry: until a few years ago scenarios for urban mobility did not necessarily contemplate the use of 
automated cars: we were discussing whether there would be cars in future smart cities; today, we discuss how 
cars will interact with the environment in smart cities. See also http://www.strc.ch/2017/Meeder_EtAl.pdf and 
the Guardian Article cited above. 
18 See https://www.fastcompany.com/40481550/the-crosswalk-of-the-future-moves-and-changes-to-prioritize-
pedestrians.  
19 See https://www.inverse.com/article/35686-driverless-cars-pedestrian-safety-future.  
20 “Humans should choose how and whether to delegate decisions to AI systems, to accomplish human-chosen 
objectives”. See futureoflife.org/ai-principles. 
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Mittelstadt et al. (2016) put it, one of the key ethical issues associated with algorithms is the 
so-called ‘garbage in, garbage out’ problem, which makes the quality of the output (and most 
likely, the desirability of the outcome) dependent on the quality of the input received.21 The 
twin problems of inconclusive or misguided evidence are never factored into the analysis of the 
trolley problem, but are indeed essential to guide our initial decision on whether to trust the 
system or not.  
What is happening, in this respect, in the world of self-driving cars? There is a raging battle 
between some industry players (e.g. large tech giants), who would like self-driving cars to base 
their decision only on what their sensors signal (as in the case of Waymo’s purely offline cars, 
but also in line with rumours about Apple’s recent patent application for Autonomous 
Navigation Systems);22 players that advocate the use of information received from other cars 
(Vehicle-to-Vehicle, or V2V communication); and yet another group of players (in particular, 
European telecommunications companies and the whole of the EU) that propose that self-
driving cars use information received from the infrastructure (Vehicle to Infrastructure, V2I) or 
from the whole environment (Vehicle-to-Environment, V2E).23 The latter implies reliance on 5G 
networks, LiDAR sensors, and other fixed and wireless infrastructure sources. This debate is still 
ongoing: in the US, significant investment was made so far on V2V systems, but in Europe the 
story might unfold differently. A likely evolution is that self-driving cars will end up using only 
sensors and wireless technology when in sparsely populated areas, but may also use 5G and 
fixed infrastructure (e.g. embedded in street lighting) when the density of the population allows 
for the deployment of more expensive technologies.  
But the amount of data that might be processed by a self-driving car at any given point in time 
could also be much greater, if technological development allows. For example, distributed 
ledger architectures could be used to build a real-time shared description of the state of the 
road infrastructure (including the presence of humans). This might reduce the need for heavy 
investment in multi-technology systems to be installed on the vehicle and within the 
surrounding infrastructure. Cars would then coordinate on the basis of a single, verifiable 
description of the current state of the road. Not surprisingly, car manufacturers such as Toyota, 
Porsche and Daimler have invested in blockchain applications for self-driving cars: however, 
such applications will have to overcome considerable technological hurdles, not least latency, 
security and privacy concerns, before they can become viable. Apple is reportedly going in the 
opposite direction by minimising cars’ reliance on maps.24  Moreover, the use of quantum 
computing might lead to better processing of information and more advanced traffic 
                                                     
21 See B. D. Mittelstadt, P. Allo, M. Taddeo, S. Wachter and L. Floridi (2016), “The ethics of algorithms: Mapping 
the debate”, Big Data & Society, July–December 2016: 1–21. 
22  A car typically does not always distinguish a dog from a frog. See, on Apple’s recent patent application, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/21/apple-patents-navigation-system-for-self-driving-cars.html  
23 See i.a. S. Karnouskos and F. Kerschbaum (2018), “Privacy and Integrity Considerations in Hyperconnected 
Autonomous Vehicles”, Proceedings of the IEEE 2018, http://www.fkerschbaum.org/pieee18.pdf  
24 See http://www.businessinsider.com/new-apple-patent-self-driving-cars-minimize-map-usage-2017-12?IR=T   
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optimisation flows, and technologies in this respect are being developed by large industrial 
conglomerates, including a new joint venture between Volkswagen and Google.25  
In other words, self-driving cars will in the future be able to use all the information we want 
them to use to solve the trolley problem, if it ever presents itself. For example, if street lights 
use cameras, the presence of pedestrians could also be detected by these fixed installations; 
should they have facial recognition capabilities, the amount of information available to the self-
driving car would also include the identity of the individuals; or, if the pedestrians that could 
possibly be hit by the car hold a smartphone or use wearables, information on their position 
could also be used from those sources, and could include many more personally identifiable 
details (I will get back to this issue later). And the use of wearables could also enable some form 
of alert warning sent by the car to the inadvertent pedestrian.26 
Finally, in circumstances in which an accident might be caused by more than one vehicle it 
would be interesting to find out what amount of information was available to each car on the 
expected behaviour of other cars. Here, it is important to distinguish between at least three 
different situations: i) a self-driving car is dealing with a human-driven car; ii) a self-driving car 
is dealing with another self-driving car, and the behavioural criteria of both cars are regulated 
and/or standardised; and iii) a scenario in which there are two or more self-driving cars, but 
their ethical or behavioural settings have been reprogrammed by their users in a way that other 
cars cannot incorporate. The second scenario is the easiest to manage for a self-driving car, 
whereas the other two might create significant problems due to the need to avoid the 
interaction of two or more algorithms, which creates significant problems in terms of outcomes 
and related liability (see below).  
In summary, knowing what the car knew is important for our crime scene investigation. And it 
gives us an important warning about the variety of business and regulatory models that still 
have to be discussed in depth and selected as the technology becomes commercially viable. 
This variety raises one issue that will apply to the remainder of this paper: where do we draw 
the line between accuracy of information and protection of personal data? Or, put differently, 
where do we draw the line between the efficiency of the algorithm and the fairness of its 
outcomes? 
Problem 3: What do we know about how the car decided? 
Even if we know what information went into the algorithm that was driving the car, we might 
not know how the algorithm decided to process the information. Algorithms can use a 
multitude of criteria to reach decisions, and these criteria might not always be transparently 
shared with users and authorities. Algorithms might be patented and proprietary, and as such 
difficult to audit or monitor. Subjecting them to close inspection or requiring that their internal 
                                                     
25  See https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/vw-google-announce-quantum-computing-partnership/ VW 
started its first quantum-computing project in March in China to optimise traffic for 10,000 taxis in Beijing, using 
another technology supplier. 
26 See http://cityobservatory.org/self-driving-cars-versus-pedestrians/  
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functioning be open to the public might be criticised as stifling the incentive to innovate by 
weakening property rights. Still, not being able to observe what algorithms do, and how they 
reach their decisions, might create insurmountable problems for law enforcement. Hence, a 
heated debate on algorithmic accountability has emerged over the past few years, especially 
in Europe, starting from competition law cases but soon expanding into many other aspects of 
our daily lives, from recruitment to street police, advertising, financial services and e-
commerce. Some authors demonise the use of algorithms based on big data analytics, defining 
them as black boxes (Pasquale 2016); “Weapons of Math Destruction” (O’Neill 2016); or 
focusing on how they can lead to dilution of liability and at the same time enable new, more 
sophisticated forms of cartels (Stucke and Ezrachi 2016).27 
The issue becomes even more problematic if one considers that the type of algorithm that will 
be used in self-driving cars is still an enigma. Neural network algorithms are seen by some as 
the most efficient and accurate, and by others as too much of a black box.28 Adaptive, self-
learning algorithms might be seen as the most technically advanced, but also as less predictable 
than others, including by their own developers.29 Clustering and pattern recognition algorithms 
need enormous amounts of data to become acceptably accurate, and as already noted, have 
significant problems in recognising moving images. Inevitably, the choice of the data sources 
used will have an impact on the type of algorithm used, and this creates a double layer of 
uncertainty in the expected evolution of algorithms in self-driving cars.30 
The debate among experts has led to some first results in terms of defining principles for 
algorithmic transparency and accountability. In particular, the Association for Computing 
Machinery issued in 2017 a “Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability”;31 and 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers released at the end of 2016 a draft for public 
discussion titled “Ethically aligned design”, which underlined the need for accountability that 
can help in “proving why a system operates in certain ways to address legal issues of culpability, 
and to avoid confusion or fear within the general public”.32 The Fairness, Accountability and 
Transparency in Machine Learning (FATML) interdisciplinary academic community worked on 
defining key principles of accountability, which include responsibility, explainability, accuracy, 
auditability and fairness (on which, see below under problem 4).33 Kroll et al. (2017) examine a 
number of avenues for improving the accountability of algorithms, including privacy-compliant 
                                                     
27 See F. Pasquale (2015), The Black Box Society. The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. C. O’Neill (2016), Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases 
Inequality and Threatens Democracy, Crown Publishers, New York. M. Stucke and A. Ezrachi (2016), Virtual 
Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. And see also Mittelstadt et al. (2016), supra note 21. 
28 See Sütfeld et al. (2017) supra note 7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See i.a., https://www.kdnuggets.com/2017/06/machine-learning-algorithms-used-self-driving-cars.html 
31  Association for Computing Machinery US Public Policy Council (USACM), available at 
http://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/2017_usacm_statement_algorithms.pdf  
32 See Ethically Aligned Design. IEE. Available at http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/ead_v1.pdf.  
33 See https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms. 
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mechanisms such as zero-knowledge proofs and fair random choices.34 Kim (2017) argued in 
response that additional empirical verification of outcomes through constant, ongoing 
monitoring would be needed to ensure that algorithms are accountable for the way they reach 
decisions.35 
That said, the issue of whether algorithms should be fully observable from third parties or 
policymakers is far from settled in the policy arena. The debate has been further promoted by 
the adoption of the EU General Data Protection Regulation, which arguably contains a right for 
end users to receive an explanation of how the algorithm works, although the scope of this 
right is far from clear in the text (and more specifically, in the recitals) of the Regulation, and 
disappeared by the final text of the European Parliament resolution on civil law rules for 
robotics, which initially advocated compliance of smart autonomous robots with the GDPR  
(Wachter et al. 2017).36 All in all, the legal system appears underdeveloped and dangerously 
fragmented, with many robotic systems likely to fall outside the scope of any attempt towards 
accountability.  
Problem 4: Better than us, or like us? 
Even if the problems of algorithmic transparency and accountability were solved, the criteria 
self-driving cars should rely upon to solve potentially fatal dilemmas would remain nebulous at 
best. So far, car manufacturers have admittedly taught their vehicles to look for the smaller 
object: but whatever lies behind this smaller object won’t be known, and the equation ‘smaller 
object equals smaller damage’, intuitively, can prove very misleading. Now assume, in this 
respect, that an algorithm is taught to seek the ‘smallest damage’, and as such pursues the goal 
of minimising social cost. This would entail that the algorithm behaves rationally, i.e. performs 
a benefit-cost analysis of alternative courses of action. This, too, would lead to a number of 
undesirable consequences.  
First, the algorithm would need to assess a variety of consequences, which (by definition) would 
include the loss of human lives, but possibly also damage to property. For example, the car 
might be confronted with an option A (e.g. hit five pedestrians) that generates no loss in 
property, and an option B (e.g. hit a wall and hurt, possibly fatally, four passengers), which 
would create damage to a highly valued monument (e.g. if the wall is an ancient Roman wall). 
If the algorithm expressed damage to assets (including cultural and environmental assets) in 
monetary terms and summed them up with estimates of the monetary equivalent of the 
human lives lost (e.g. using the Value of a Statistical Life formula),37 then it might end up 
choosing option B despite the fact that it kills more people. Alternatively, the algorithm could 
use a lexicographic ordering à la John Rawls, by giving absolute priority to minimising the 
                                                     
34 See http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9570&context=penn_law_review 
35 Pauline T. Kim (2017), “Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination”, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 189. 
36 See S. Wachter, B. Mittelstadt and L. Floridi (2017), “Transparent, Explainable and Accountable AI for Robotics”, 
Science Robotics, 2(6). 
37 See e.g. W. K. Viscusi and J. E. Aldy. (2003), “The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates 
throughout the World”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(1): 5-76. 
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impact on humans: in that case, cars might end up sacrificing invaluable cultural and 
environmental assets in the attempt to save one individual; or, in case of environmental 
damage, they might have to appraise the possible, more scattered damage to human health 
that might derive from a single course of action (e.g. polluting a river; an explosion in a 
factory). 38  Finally, the best decision-making criterion for self-driving cars might be found 
through a ‘Rawlsian’ method, by asking individuals what behaviour they would prefer, 
independently of whether they would be involved in the trolley problem scenario, and in what 
role.39 But again, the veil of ignorance is not an easy escamotage: for example, Bonnefon et al 
(2016) find that people would choose a utilitarian car: but of course, provided that they are not 
the ones sitting inside. 
Second, the problem of using some form of rational decision-making criterion does not wipe 
away the issue of algorithmic discrimination. In this respect, it is essential to note that our 
society is already substantially biased when it comes to evaluating human lives, or calculating 
damage compensation for the case of accidents: the VSL formula contains both income-related 
and age-related elements, which might be specifically factored into the analysis when deciding 
which course of action to take; and tort law explicitly takes foregone earnings (lucrum caessans) 
as a basis for compensating damages from personal injury. So, moving from a situation in which 
the car looks for the smaller object to one where it looks for the lesser damage inevitably 
introduces new elements of discrimination in the behaviour of self-driving cars.  
The culmination of all these concerns would coincide with a scenario in which a non-
transparent algorithm is taught by its manufacturer to look for the least damage for the 
company, in terms of minimisation of liability exposure. In that case, cars would really need to 
incorporate an assessment of the prospective damage compensations that the company (or its 
insurance provider) would face. Public authorities, however complacent, would not be able to 
fully observe that the car, despite officially trying to minimise social cost, is indeed trying to 
minimise private cost: discriminatory consequences would be as significant as they are hard to 
police.  
More generally, the jury is still out on whether algorithm developers and vendors should be 
considered liable for discrimination whenever their algorithms’ biases reflect existing biases in 
our society. This debate is now finally moving from the initially, largely unsatisfactory premise 
that algorithms should be ‘neutral’, and is now moving towards more meaningful dilemmas.40 
For example, Google was criticised because its search engine is reportedly far more likely to 
advertise a highly paid executive job to what it perceives to be a white male compared to an 
                                                     
38 Isaac Asimov’s three laws of robotics apparently aim at this type of lexicographic ordering. They go as follows: 
i) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm, ii) A robot 
must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; iii) A robot 
must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. 
39 See the so-called “veil of ignorance” in J. Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA. 
40 See A. Renda (2015), “Searching for Harm, or Harming Search? A look at the European Commission’s antitrust 
investigation against Google”, CEPS Special Report No. 118 / September 2015.  
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African-American woman (Sweeney 2013).41 The PredPol software that implemented “minority 
report” by indicating to police stations where to send their troops as a crime is probably “about 
to happen” always send troops to the same urban ghettos. Algorithms suggest the inspection 
of people that look dark-skinned, or appear likely to be Muslim. In all these circumstances, 
discrimination exists independently of algorithms, but may be exacerbated by their systematic 
use. Then the question emerges: should algorithms behave better than we do, or exactly as we 
do? 
Take this problem to the domain of self-driving cars. And now, assume that the car could take 
into account personally identifiable data when deciding how to solve the dilemma, and who to 
save. If the car can only detect, however roughly, the age of the pedestrians involved, then it 
might decide to opt for the younger ones (but not too young, as compensating damage for the 
death of children is, unfortunately, likely to be cheaper than compensating the life of a wealthy 
young adult). But if the car knew more, for example thanks to facial recognition technologies, 
then it could choose based on the perceived contribution to social welfare of the individuals 
involved, and even information on their “social credit score”.42 So, imagine again that the car 
must choose between option A (killing five people) and option B (killing four): then, it might use 
a variety of information sources (e.g. recognition of data in the individual’s smartphones and 
wearables; facial recognition coupled with social credit score information; probabilistic 
determinations based on the identification of individuals in transit in that area over the past 
two minutes; images recorded by preceding cars and transmitted through V2V; police records, 
etc.). As a result, there can clearly be cases in which the four people in the car will be considered 
more ‘valuable’ than the five people in the street, and the final decision will, again, be an 
optimisation one.  
Removing algorithmic biases and reaching a satisfactory balance between algorithmic 
efficiency and adequate protection of users’ privacy are two almost intractable problems today; 
in addition to the inevitable trade-offs that one incurs when trying to provide answers, it is 
worth recalling that the ‘right’ thing to do very much depends on the values expressed by our 
communities, which can differ significantly across the globe. For example, a life/death decision 
taken by a machine on the basis of a social credit score might be acceptable in South Korea, 
but not in Europe; and a more informed decision based on personally identifiable data might 
be more acceptable in the US (where credit history already leads to significant discriminations 
in access to consumer goods) than in Europe. These boundaries might also change over time, 
of course, but as of today the existence of a single lens through which to judge what behaviour 
is right or wrong across countries and populations is pure utopia. The differences in responses 
given to the trolley problem are, if anything, a good instance of how wide-ranging individual 
perceptions are of right and wrong: scholars have also investigated this issue, prompting 
                                                     
41 See L. Sweeney (2013), Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2208240. 
42 See https://www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/. 
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Buddhist monks with a variant of the trolley problem. From the Kantian categorical imperative 
to utilitarianism and Buddhist ethics, all angles have already been explored.43 
The difficulty of solving these problems has led to an unexpected development in scholarly 
literature. Scholars are not trying to model human behaviour to ensure that cars, rather than 
behaving better, behave exactly like us, and thus impulsively, rather than rationally. Sütfeld et 
al. (2017) observe that “simple models based on one-dimensional value-of-life scales are suited 
to describe human ethical behaviour” in these circumstances, and as such would be preferable 
to more arcane decision-making criteria, which might ultimately appear too complex, 
insufficiently transparent, and difficult to predict. This solution appears counterintuitive but 
oriented towards two essential aspects of technology and society: the acceptability of 
outcomes, and the predictability thereof, which is fostered by a greater alignment of robots 
with human behaviour. Not surprisingly, rule 11 of the already mentioned Asilomar principles 
prescribes that “AI systems should be designed and operated so as to be compatible with ideals 
of human dignity, rights, freedoms, and cultural diversity”. But then again, why design 
autonomous vehicles if then we ask them to replicate our well-known biases and 
imperfections? 
Problem 5: Who is going to be liable? 
Our crime scene investigation is mostly aimed at determining what happened, and who is liable 
for the damage done. But the two results don’t come at once: with algorithms, even if the 
whole accident and causation chain is identified, attributing liability can be a daunting task. 
There are two different issues that are worth highlighting in this respect. The first relates to the 
possible distancing between the tortfeasor and the damage incurred that can result from the 
use of an algorithm. In some circumstances, a car manufacturer could object that the damage 
occurred due to an unforeseen event, which even a high-capacity computer could not process; 
or that external circumstances intervened (e.g. a cyber attack), which did not depend on the 
negligence of the manufacturer, the vendor, or the transportation company (e.g. if a company 
like Uber or Lyft had provided the self-driving car). This led a few commentators to argue for a 
“strict liability” (or “no-fault liability”) principle that would extend to the sphere of control of 
the tortfeasor whatever course of action was decided by the AI system in the self-driving car 
(Floridi 2016). 44  This could occur along the lines of the products liability directive, which 
however contemplates the possibility that tortfeasors escape liability whenever the likelihood 
that the product was defective, and thus likely to cause damage to consumers, could not be 
known based on the state of the art of scientific research at the time the product was placed 
on the market.    
                                                     
43 See https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/how-do-buddhist-monks-think-about-the-
trolley-problem/532092/. 
44 L. Floridi (2016), “Faultless responsibility: on the nature and allocation of moral responsibility for distributed 
moral actions”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Volume 374, issue 2083.  See also D.C. Vladeck 
(2017), “Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence”, Washington Law Review, Vol. 
89:117. 
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Second, an even more complex problem arises whenever it is the interaction between 
algorithms that causes damage. Some readers will recall the famous ‘flash crash of 2.45’, the 
trillion-dollar stock market crash of May 2010 that was caused by a clash of algorithms, and left 
millions of dollars burnt and no one responsible for compensating them; or the mind-boggling 
price surge of the book “The Making of a Fly”, which due to an unforeseen interaction between 
algorithms ended up costing more than 23 million dollars on Amazon.45 We do not have a legal 
rule that is tailored to these accidents, even if rules on joint and several liability, or rules that 
apportion liability based on the degree of contribution to the damage, might be adapted for 
use in the algorithm age.  
More generally, there is reason to believe that the more AI systems become smart and able to 
learn, the more their decisions will be taken with a degree of autonomy, the greater the 
potential distance between their ‘creators’ and the damage they will generate. The European 
Parliament, in its report on civil law rules for robotics, even argued that smart autonomous 
robots should be given “rights and duties”.46 But the level of autonomy of these robots might 
not become, at least in the foreseeable future, advanced enough to really earn these machines 
the right to be treated as legal entities. On the contrary, even partly autonomous machines 
might still be linked, from a legal perspective, to their developers: this would mean that robots 
are treated as ‘slaves’ to their ‘masters’: and indeed, this is the etymological meaning of the 
word ‘robot’.47 A different approach would be to treat robots as animals under civil law rules, 
which entails that any damage they cause would be attributable to their owners whenever 
negligence in custody can be proved (so-called culpa in vigilando).48  
Intermezzo: Ubiquitous robots, the fat guy on the bridge, and the need for 
system-level analysis 
There is no limit to imagination when it comes to the possible benefits and possible risks that 
could occur from the delegation of decision-making powers to robots. Most importantly, the 
solution of the trolley problem would need to take into account the whole transportation 
system, rather than focusing on an individual vehicle.49 Compared to the traditional trolley 
problem, in future robots might intervene to solve the problem in many other ways. For 
example, in the traditional example of the trolley problem, there could be AI systems both in 
the vehicle and in the switch management system; and other robots could be available nearby, 
                                                     
45 The book was being sold by two Amazon.com marketplace sellers, each of which was basing its price on the 
other. 
46 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)). 
47 See https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms. 
48 See R. Kelley, E. Schaerer, M. Gomez and M. Nicolescu (2010), “Liability in Robotics: An International Perspective 
on Robots as Animals”, 24 Advanced Robotics 13 (2010).  
49 See J. Borenstein, J. R. Herckert and K. W. Miller (2017), “Self-Driving Cars and Engineering Ethics: The Need for 
a System Level Analysis”, Science and Engineering Ethics, November 2017, pp. 1-16. 
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and might possibly intervene to move the pedestrians from their current position. Take this 
popular variant of the trolley problem:  
You are on a footbridge, and next to you there is a very fat man. You realise that by pushing 
the man down the bridge you would manage to slow down the train and save the five lives 
of the pedestrians stuck on the tracks.  
In ethics, most people would decide not to push down the fat man. But what if instead of you, 
the bystander on a footbridge was a robot? Should that robot, not directly involved in the 
dynamics of the trolley problem, be instructed to act to minimise the damage by killing the fat 
man? In principle, this would be possible, and consistent with a supreme imperative given to 
robots, to maximise social welfare. Connected robots would be able to communicate 
seamlessly and in real time, to find the most effective remedy to a compromised situation: the 
fact that the remedy entails the sacrifice of an innocent bystander would not represent an 
obstacle for a highly robot-intensive society, since the key option of preserving human lives is 
already impossible to achieve. But then, would we be comfortable living in a society in which 
robots obey a supreme imperative, which might require the sacrifice of human lives? Again, 
this would not be the first time we take such a decision: we have gone to war knowing that we 
would lose lives; we have built infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and railroad tracks 
knowing that someone would lose his or her life; and we decide on pollution standards and 
spending resources for prevention and post-disaster relief trying to optimise a cost-benefit 
equation rather by minimising the number of lives lost. 
Under these assumptions, there is a need to decide whether the degree of autonomy of a 
connected robot should only apply to the immediate proximity of its behaviour, and the sphere 
of control of its master. Alternatively, robots could also be endowed with the possibility of 
taking action to avoid major damage to the benefit of society as a whole, but only in specific 
circumstances, which would need to be defined. The etymological root of the word ‘robot’ 
originates in the Czech word for ‘slave’ or ‘forced labour’: this would suggest a close 
relationship between the behaviour of the robot and the sphere of control of its master.  
Conclusion: A quick mapping of the key ethical issues of the AI age 
How useful is the trolley problem for self-driving cars? And how dangerous is it? In this paper, 
I have argued that rather than being useful per se, the problem can become a very good starting 
point for a pervasive mapping of the unresolved issues related to the use of robots in various 
aspects of our daily life. As some experts start imagining a complete transition towards self-
driving cars within the next two decades, and a boom in the number of smart and connected 
objects over the same timeframe, the impact of our choices today in terms of interoperability, 
connectivity, human control, data availability, legal liability, privacy protection and user 
empowerment can make a real difference for the sustainability of our social model in years to 
come. This paper has tried to ‘un-ask’ the trolley question by showing that the surrounding 
policy issues are so much more important and complex, that preventing the dilemma from ever 
happening becomes a compelling choice. The trick is to take a step backwards and consider 
14 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
that human control should always be prioritised and even enhanced by regulatory decisions. 
Treating robots as independent, autonomous legal persons would not go in that direction. 
Ironically, even if self-driving cars must be recognised as having outstanding potential in terms 
of saving human lives, there seems to be good reasons to avoid creating the conditions for 
them to interact with pedestrians and, if needed, to decide on human lives in a split second.  
The key findings of our crime scene investigation are summarised below.  
First, whenever possible, the delegation of choices related to human life to robots or algorithms 
should be avoided. Any infrastructural choice that can prevent robots from interfering with 
human behaviour should be pursued, unless absolutely impractical. This should be taken as 
part of an overall attempt to preserve human control in the long run.  
Second, modelling the functioning and effectiveness of algorithms is impossible if one does not 
discuss the underlying technology and data. Delegating specific functions to a blind car is 
different from delegating them to a fully informed vehicle that receives information in a secure 
way from a mix of sources. In this respect, the more data is available to robots (subject to 
confidentiality constraints), the better the final outcome: however, the weight of this 
technology on the operation of the vehicle would also need to be considered. The choice of 
which technologies to use is also largely an industrial policy dilemma, especially if one considers 
that 5G telephony might be preferred by EU and Chinese players, whereas V2V technology has 
already been publicly and privately funded in the United States.  
Third, algorithm accountability and decision-making criteria must be subject to further 
elaboration. To establish trust in the algorithmic process, some degree of observability is 
needed, be it in the form of auditing, transparency obligations, black box recording (ex post 
observation), etc. This, once settled, still does not solve the issue of which criterion should be 
used for decision-making, and whether users would be able to modify this criterion. 
Fourth, it is important that algorithms follow a logic of user empowerment rather than one of 
protecting passive citizens. This could even go as far as enabling citizens to modify their 
algorithms, to the extent that this is known to other machines. Without this possibility, the 
criteria for algorithmic decision-making would need to be standardised and remain 
unmodifiable by end users.   
Fifth, we need liability rules that are not only adapted by a robot-intensive world, but also to a 
world in which algorithms interact with each other, possibly creating unpredictable outcomes, 
for which attributing liability would not be easy unless the whole process is fully traceable, and 
apportionment criteria are available.   
Sixth, there is no final word on whether algorithms should be allowed to reflect, exacerbate or 
mitigate the biases existing in our society. The original answer is that they should improve 
outcomes compared to what biased legal rules and patterns of human behaviour normally 
produce: but the meaning of ‘improve’ appears to be utterly obscure. Should organ donation 
algorithms award priority to younger people, as this would maximise the impact on life-years 
added? Or to older people, as they won’t be able to profit from subsequent technological 
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developments? Or to those who are mostly likely to evolve into highly paid human beings? 
Should banking algorithms deny loans to what they perceive as unlikely to repay them, based 
on their personal characteristics and big data analytics? And if they do, will malicious algorithms 
attempt to take advantage of decisions based on past statistics? Will there be a need to 
‘rebalance’ the role of the state? 
In summary, ethical issues range from process-related (e.g. the transparency of the algorithms) 
to outcome-related (e.g. discrimination). Our legal system is currently insufficiently equipped 
to cope with all these issues, and the emergence of largely self-regulated governance schemes 
can only exacerbate the problem. In other words, the trolley problem is welcome inasmuch as 
it prompts us to take action to solve all these issues, rather than to choose one course of action 
over another.   
 
Problem Policy challenge/response 
1. How did the car end up 
there? 
- Avoid delegating life-threatening decisions to machines 
- Preserve human control as a key item in policy shaping  
2. What did the car know? - Adopt a clear and predictable data policy for self-driving cars, 
balancing privacy and efficiency 
- Test the use of privacy-compliant distributed ledgers for 
automated vehicles 
- Experiment with forms of differential privacy in algorithms to 
strike the balance between efficiency and privacy   
3. What do we know about 
how the car decided? 
- Clarify the legal framework for algorithmic accountability and 
transparency 
- Clarify the applicability and scope of the right to explanation 
under the GDPR 
- Establish an obligation for ex post inspection of automated 
vehicle ‘black boxes’ (or action logs)  
4. Better than us, or like 
us? 
- Define a set of principles for algorithmic decision-making, 
including clear criteria for separating lawful from unlawful 
discrimination  
- Work on anti-polarisation strategies to avoid the AI-powered 
exacerbation of existing biases  
5. Who is liable? - Define strict liability principles for algorithm-powered decision-
making 
- Define legal rules for damages caused by the interaction 
between algorithms 
 
